Although a national policy of nuclear deterrence that apparently has not “failed” would seem worthy of continuation by a nuclear power, ways of improving that deterrent may be considered. One may argue, in fact, that given the high stakes in the current nuclear balance of power if deterrence should fail, a non-aggressive nuclear power is morally obligated to enhance the credibility of its deterrent to ensure continued “success” in maintaining the nuclear peace. One international security expert who now serves in the Reagan administration suggested over a decade ago that it is somewhat unreasonable to expect any security system to function effectively for an indefinite period of time. The conventional wisdom of a generation, therefore, may be in need of regeneration.
In this brief essay, I shall first consider the conceptual meaning and varieties of nuclear deterrence, then compare the credibilities of the basic options available to the U.S. as a presumably non-aggressive nuclear superpower vis-a-vis the potentially aggressive U.S.S.R. (extrapolating from recent history), and finally outline some specific components of a more feasible, improved U.S. nuclear deterrent. These recommendations conform to the general direction of recent trends in American defense policymaking, but I hope to provide a more cohesive, prudential rationale for the enhancements.
The integral relation in this area of policy between feasibility and ethics must not be ignored. Any truly ethical public policy must be capable of practical implementation lest it prove a chimera or a cruel joke on the moral agents. Indeed, an ostensibly ethical policy that is in fact impractical and that cannot achieve its stated end is, in traditional Thomistic moral theology, immoral. One cannot logically or morally will an end and not will the necessary means to that end. Visions of universal peace, for example, ensuing from unilateral disarmament by the U.S., whether nuclear or total, may be noble and uplifting in intention, but they are at the same time counter-productive and potentially. dangerous in their effects, owing to the historically demonstrable impracticality of the proposed means. Thus, feasibility in the matter of nuclear deterrence imparts a more ethical structure to defense policy-making insofar as the universally acknowledged goal is the prevention of nuclear war and the means sought none other than that which will tend with the greatest probability to achieve that end. Within certain broad parameters, therefore, such as those indicated by the classic Western “just war tradition,” the equation will hold: the ethical (in terms of the teleological categories of intention, means-end relations, and actual consequences) depends on what is credible, which, in turn, depends on what is feasible.
A generation ago, Fr. John Courtney Murray, S.J., argued that “since nuclear war may be a necessity, it must be made a possibility.” Nothing has changed in the intervening twenty-five years to dim the wisdom of that fundamental insight. Only a credible U.S. policy of nuclear deterrence — that is, one that actually deters Soviet aggression because the Soviets fear the realistic possibility, or feasibility, of the threatened alternative — may be considered in any meaningful sense ethical.
The Concept of Deterrence
The fundamental conceptual problem of deterrence as an expression of defense policy concerns the relation between a doctrine of nuclear deterrence and a nuclear “war-fighting” doctrine — a distinction that Colin Gray among others labels “spurious.” If the distinction is pressed too far, as many critics of recent U.S. defense strategies are wont to do, then Gray is quite correct, especially give the exigencies of the nuclear age and the ideological character of the Soviet regime, both of which mandate contingency plans in the event of armed conflict at any level between the superpowers. There is, however, a sense in which a war-fighting posture exceeds the parameters of contingency plans such as the classified U.S. Single Integral Operational Plan (S.I.O.P.). The task at hand is to indicate how a nuclear war-fighting posture represents not so much a distinctive mode of defense as it does a form of deterrence — indeed, perhaps, the most credible nuclear deterrent.
Clarity in defining terms is a prerequisite to any discussion of credible deterrence. Thomas C. Schelling has not helped matters by comparing deterrence to “compellence” in such a manner as to suggest that the latter usually entails the initiative of some form of force, whereas deterrence employs passive indefinite threats alone. That arbitrary contrast would needlessly undermine my contention here that an expressed readiness to use force — in this case nuclear weapons — is an essential component of a credible deterrent. The definitions of Robert Art, Patrick Morgan, and Joseph Coffey are far more useful and open-ended. For Art deterrence is “the threat of retaliation” in order “to prevent an adversary from doing something that one does not want him to do and that he might otherwise be tempted to do.” The salient characteristics are the intent to prevent a certain action and the manifest will and capability of the deterrer to counteract the adversary. The scope and intensity of the threat may be specified or left somewhat ambiguous, and there are advocates of both styles. But credibility requires certainty of response. Morgan adds to this consideration the need for clear communications between the adversaries; that is, the threat must be meaningful to and unmistakably understood by the adversary. Coffey has refined the types of deterrence to encompass denial, risk, and punishment. It is the first that seems most relevant to the nuclear rivalry between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Coffey further refines deterrence through denial in strategic nuclear war in accordance with three specific intents: (1) to frustrate or repulse the actual or potential attacks of an adversary, (2) to reduce his gains from military operations, (3) to wage nuclear war to victory “either as a means of dissuasion or as a hedge against the failure of deterrence.”
Among these refinements by Coffey only (1) and (2) would be appropriate for a U.S. policy of nuclear deterrence at both the strategic and theatre levels. A clear-cut “victory” in any strategic exchange, however limited, would entail such human carnage and social disruption as to be pyrrhic at best and most probably only marginally distinguishable from “defeat.” To be sure, this contention seems to conflict with the erstwhile “war-winning” rhetoric of the Reagan administration and its theoretical supporters such as Colin Gray, whose emphasis on active and civil defense within an overall defense policy of strategic superiority presumes some nebulous standard of exploitable military advantage in a protracted strategic nuclear exchange. But I rest confident in the classic Clausewitzian wisdom that war (or in this case deterrence) must be linked to realistic political objectives. Unless the U.S. leadership indulges in the grandiose delusion of not only surviving an all-out strategic exchange, whether protracted or spasm in nature (or successfully limiting a punishing strategic exchange to something less than massive), but also emerging victorious with some semblance of American culture still intact (as perhaps the Soviets are led to believe they can by the force of their own ideology or imperial arrogance), any war-winning modes of deterrence through punishment or denial must be categorically excluded as incredible because they are infeasible. A policy that is not credible to the enemy will not deter him from putting it to the test.
In the current geopolitical context the U.S. can hope only for a continuation of the balance of political power and, in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between it and the U.S.S.R. (or between NATO and the Warsaw Pact), for a return to the status quo ante. Hence merely a sufficiency of strategic and theatre power, both nuclear and conventional, is needed to deter Soviet aggression. Coffey defines “sufficiency” for a policy of deterrence through punishment as the minimum force required “to inflict unacceptable damage” to an adversary regardless of the force levels of that adversary. For a policy of deterrence through denial the “unacceptable damage” would be equivalent, I surmise, to that anticipated level which would render any attack militarily unsuccessful. In this connection Michael Howard allows, correctly in my estimation, for a war-fighting component of a posture of deterrence. The goal is not the forlorn hope of nuclear victory but the capacity to deny the adversary any chance for a meaningful victory: “to set on victory for our opponent a price that he cannot possibly afford to pay .” Thus, at length is a feasible connection established between deterrent and war-fighting modes of defense. I would differ from Howard only in stressing the need for a nuclear as well as conventional war-fighting deterrent capability.
Comparing the Strategic Options
Naturally, an across-the-board bolstering of all defensive systems might contribute to the overall defensive posture of the U.S. (or U.S.S.R.) but not necessarily to a policy of nuclear deterrence through denial. Therefore, it is necessary to isolate those defensive components the enhancement of which would add most to the credibility of the U.S. as a nuclear superpower. I shall focus here briefly on strategic nuclear doctrine, although the guiding principle of deterrence through denial would apply similarly to the theatre and tactical nuclear levels and to conventional weaponry.
Given the current choice in U.S. strategic thinking between the fundamental options of “mutual assured destruction” (MAD) and “flexible response,” which was first advanced as official defense policy by Secretary of Defense James D. Schlesinger in 1974 and modified further by Presidential Directive 59 of President Carter in 1980 and still further by the more pronounced “counterforce” doctrine of the Reagan administration, the more recent trend would appear decidedly preferable in the interests of credibility. A third option, however, seems to be emerging — namely, “strategic defense.” At this juncture it is not clear whether this trend promises to issue in a distinctive alternative to the two traditional doctrines or merely represents a complementary defensive component capable of being integrated into existing offensive strategies of deterrence.
The key assumption of persistent advocates of MAD such as Herbert Scoville, Robert Jarvis, and Theodore Draper is the extremely reduced chances of a nuclear war between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. ever commencing at any level in light of the precarious balance of terror and the impossibility of guaranteeing a limit on any nuclear exchange. MAD, or “minimum deterrence” as its advocates understandably prefer to label this doctrine, requires a sufficiency of devastating retaliatory force directed chiefly against “counter-value” targets such as civilian population centers and major industries, supported ostensibly by a recognized resolve to execute the threat, if necessary. And so MAD supporters, though usually not without some anxiety and ethical qualms, take refuge under the supposedly stable nuclear umbrella of protection, eschewing as “destabilizing” any significant changes in the quality or quantity of offensive nuclear weapons and usually any defensive measures as well that would reduce the vulnerability of either the U.S. or U.S.S.R. to massive attack by the current nuclear arsenals.
Notwithstanding the credibility of a Soviet policy of assured destruction, given their different value system, a U.S. policy of MAD is wholly incredible. For a credible deterrent depends not on the enormity of the consequences if it should fail—to which enormity I believe no U.S. president of either political party, nurtured by American ethical values and culture, would, in the final analysis, contribute — but rather on the likely prospect of a firm, realistic (hence limited) nuclear response if the other side should call the U.S. “bluff.” The ethical enormity of any countervalue targeting derives precisely from the use or, in truth, misuse, of relatively innocent civilians as virtual hostages in an international chess game of nerves. Such implicit threats of explicit violence against non-combatants violate boldly and unabashedly the principle of discrimination which is so essential to the classic just war tradition. Whether the consciences of U.S. policymakers were moved to revulsion at this prospect by the unmistakable Christian teaching of St. Paul not to do evil that good may come (Romans 3:8) or by less overtly religious sources of inspiration such as that provided by Immanuel Kant’s “categorical imperative” not to treat human persons merely as a means, they would never resort to the wholesale destruction of civilian populations in a wanton, futile second-strike in retaliation for a Soviet first-strike, much less launch a massive countervalue bombardment of their own against an enemy similarly equipped. And the Soviets themselves know this, or at least they strongly suspect it.
In this connection, advocates of variants of “flexible response” such as Colin Gray and Albert Wohlstetter who recommend a policy of “counterforce” targeting (that is, military forces and installations) within a scheme of limited escalation also raise the troubling question: who really is the object of deterrence? Gray argues, “Unless one is willing to endorse the proposition that nuclear deterrence is all bluff, there can be no evading the requirement that the defense community has to design nuclear employment options that a reasonable political leader would not be self-deterred from ever executing, however reluctantly.” Because MAD scares the U.S. it does not necessarily follow that it would deter the Soviets, if they happen to share this viewpoint in the first place. Wohlstetter observes sardonically, “The residual fear that the West might deliberately blow up the world tends to terrify some in our own elites much more than the Soviets who chatter less on this subject.” The “balance of resolve,” to use Jarvis’ phrase, shifts in favor of the U.S. only when the U.S. force posture is directed against presumed Soviet and not American perceptions of nuclear reality. This amounts, in short, as stated above, to a denial— no more, no less — of any plausible Soviet theory of strategic victory. The Soviet nuclear arsenal and military forces alone need be targeted for this purpose. And the Soviets know it.
That a nuclear exchange could be kept limited in magnitude and in target selection is, of course, a matter of contention. The recent celebrated pastoral letter on war and peace by the Roman Catholic bishops in America presumes the likelihood of an unlimited exchange once strategic nuclear weapons are introduced into any conflict and challenges those with opposing viewpoints to prove “that meaningful limitation is possible.” The obvious presumptiousness and insufficiency of this argument have been attacked by many perceptive critics of the pastoral letter such as James Finn. But perhaps the most telling criticism of this “Chicken Little” approach to the possibility of limited nuclear war, at least in the initial stages of a U.S. response to a restrained Soviet first-strike, dates back to Fr. Murray’s little pamphlet of 1959: “To say that the possibility of limited war cannot be created by intelligence and energy, under the direction of a moral imperative, is to succumb to some sort of determinism in human affairs.”
Enter now the latest debate on defensive measures as a form of nuclear deterrence. As a merely potential third force, of course, the parameters of “strategic defense” are hardly defined and appear to encompass a wide range of means and purposes. The chief designer of the hydrogen bomb, Edward Teller, for example, stresses civil defense measures and so-called “dust defense,” or “buried bomb defense” — the use of small nuclear missiles to disarm incoming attack missiles without detonating them (theoretically, that is). Norman R. Augustine would prefer movable, non-nuclear devices to defend U.S. missile silos, assisted by an overlay of space-based infrared-sensing probes and interceptors, coupled with a deceptively-based deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in silos hardened by additional steel and concrete. Richard L. Garwin calls for a combined nuclear and conventional defense of missile silos within the conditions of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1972 in order to ensure an adequate retaliatory force, but he also urges arms control negotiations that would prohibit space-based weapons of any kind. Robert Jastrow, an erstwhile science advisor to President Reagan, believes a “layered defense” of missile sites and cities is technologically possible through the development of laser beams aimed from space and “smart,” or precision-guided, conventional mini-missiles. According to the granddaddy of them all, the “High Frontier” concept advanced by Gen. Daniel O. Graham in behalf of a diverse project team, the U.S. is at the threshold of “a new national strategy of Assured Survival,” which “would restore the traditional U.S. military ethic” of soldierly defense-mindedness. Such excessive confidence and exaggerated claims riot-withstanding, “High Frontier” does promise a layered strategic defense of U.S. missile silos, if not cities, that could be developed and deployed by the end of the century. Graham envisions a system utilizing an array of purely non-nuclear weapons, devices and intelligence equipment based in space and on land adjacent to valuable missiles. It is by far the most detailed and seemingly practical scheme yet devised and, as such, will be discussed below in the section of this essay on specific recommendations.
The list of versions of strategic defense could continue at length, particularly since President Reagan officially endorsed the concept of ballistic missile defense in his now famous speech of March 23, 1983. That speech launched the administration’s “Strategic Defense Initiative” (SDI), or what the media and the uninformed and unsympathetic, in particular, persist in mislabeling “Star Wars.” The President simply announced (in the vaguest, most nuanced language, to be sure) “a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles.
The improved ethical quality that such a purely defensive, anti-nuclear system (in whatever eventual form) would lend the U.S. deterrent posture can hardly be questioned by any fair and reasonable observer. The expressed intention that motivates this move and the nature of the likely means to be employed — simple conventional anti-weapon devices such as swarms of small steel and concrete pellets fired at great velocity (for example, the SWARMJET system), or complex yet non-nuclear phased-array radar systems and laser beams — would represent clearly discernible ethical improvements over the present panoply of nuclear ordinance of vast inhuman destructiveness.
Ethical doubts may persist, ironically, only with respect to the political and technical feasibility of the various systems and of the concept of strategic defense in general. Would these defensive measures with reasonably high probability deter the Soviets from launching a disabling nuclear first-strike? Or would the actual consequences of a unilateral attempt by the U.S. to install such a defensive barrier “provoke” the Soviets into an otherwise unplanned preemptive attack before the barrier were fully erected? Of course, the Soviets are presently working feverishly on their own strategic defensive initiative, improving their allowable ABM system around Moscow and doing God knows what else. For the sake of argument, however, let this fact be set aside. In that case, the negative, unintended ethical consequences of a U.S. defense initiative obviously would outweigh the good of the desired end. In an attempt to mitigate that risk, George Weigel, for example, who foresees the inevitable necessity of “defensive capabilities,” has suggested that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. begin “joint research” with a view toward developing mutually effective defenses against offensive nuclear weapons. Even more novel, but still unbelievable to the Presidents’ incredulous hard-core critics, is President Reagan’s repeated offer — most spectacularly during his second presidential debate with Walter F. Mondale on October 21, 1984 — to share with the Soviets themselves any advanced technology that the U.S. might utilize in the development of a suitable strategic defense. If that offer is genuine, as I am inclined to believe, it would certainly smooth the ethical rough edges of the problem of political infeasibility. U.S. strategic defense would be basically feasible, if not entirely characteristic of the tendency to safeguard our Yankee ingenuity.
There would remain then only the thorny political question of whether various components of a strategic defense policy would violate the terms of the ABM Treaty and the corollary question whether that Treaty is even worth upholding in light of apparently repeated Soviet violations, especially the massive radar system currently under construction in the Central Asia region of the U.S.S.R. far from the national perimeter as permitted by the Treaty. Devoted advocates of arms control, who value the ABM Treaty as the only truly “successful” instance of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) negotiations during the 1970s, blanch at the prospect of scuttling this bilateral agreement or attempting to clarify or revise its provisions so as to allow even a limited point-defense of counterforce targets. Given the overriding concern of minimizing the threat to the U.S. posed by Soviet ballistic missiles, I should not lose much sleep over any changes in or outright termination of the ABM Treaty. This seems to be the predominant attitude within the second Reagan administration, although, to be sure, President Reagan seems suddenly eager to use his own Strategic Defense Initiative as an incentive — and perhaps a “bargaining chip” — in renewed arms control talks with the Soviets.
As for the problem of technical feasibility, this debate probably will continue long after a workable system has been in place. That seems to be the pattern of scientific and technological advancement. Not one of the advocates of some form of strategic defense envisions a perfect system with no “leakage.” The promise is rather one of probable cost to the Soviets in terms of destroyed attack missiles exceeding the value of the risk entailed in attacking in the first place; hence, deterrence is the operating principle and not a one hundred percent kill ratio. Critics persist, however, often in Luddite fashion, to declare ballistic missile defense impractical or invariably obsolescent due to foreseeable concurrent developments in offensive nuclear weaponry. One objection that does loom significant is the irrelevancy of ballistic missile defense vis-a-vis non-ballistic nuclear weapons such as tactical nuclear weapons for use on the battlefield or air-breathing cruise missiles, which are being deployed by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in increasing numbers. “Active” air defenses such as early warning radars and improved fighter aircraft as well as “passive” civil defense programs might be considered for the latter. In any case, the chief advantage of strategic defense should not be gainsaid; an entire class of nuclear weapons could be effectively neutralized.
It is also important to note that at this time nothing is off the drawing board. The billions of dollars allocated by the U.S. Congress to strategic defense are paying for research and development alone. In his annual report for fiscal year 1985, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger anticipates actual decisions in the early 1990s as to whether and how to proceed with these programs. Predictions of technical infeasibility ought to be tabled until the evidence is conclusive. In the meantime, it is most feasible to proceed with the research and development, as well the Soviets know from experience.
A More Credible Deterrent
What then are the chief characteristics of a more credible policy of “defensive counterforce flexible response” — an awkward phrase, to be sure, but as the concept is newly emerging, so must the proper nomenclature come in time.
First, despite its arguable utility against the Soviets heretofore, the ultimate provision of all “countervailing” versions of flexible response for a countervalue strategic attack as a last resort or as the logical terminus of a graduated response ought to be discarded for the reason indicated above that in an era of strategic nuclear parity, or rough equivalence, it is unrealistic to expect a U.S. president, except perhaps in the heat of crisis in a “spasm” war (and even then only if he has taken leave of his senses) to order such an attack. It is essential, however, to maintain the feature of limited graduated response apart from classic countervalue targets, for this is precisely how the U.S. is traditionally disposed to respond to aggression. And the Soviets know it, notwithstanding the tendency towards indiscriminate bombing at the height of both the Second World War and the Vietnam War.
Second, all targeting plans and weapons procurements ought to conform to a pure doctrine of counterforce and counterforces (or countercombatants). If the goal in any strategic conflict is to deny Soviet gains from an act of aggression and not to win outright or to destroy the enemy as a viable power, then only the military forces of the enemy need be the focus of any counterattack, particularly the Soviets’ own nuclear ICBMs, nuclear submarine bases, the command, control, and communications (C3) centers, and the numerous divisions of conventional ground forces deployed in Eastern Europe and along the Soviet-Chinese border. This kind of publicly declared war-fighting policy alone seems feasible from both the military and the political (that is, deterrent) standpoints, for anything broader in scope would risk a much wider war, which the U.S. never seems prepared either by tradition or by current will to prosecute. One might also argue effectively that the highest value targets within the U.S.S.R. and its empire—as postulated by the Soviet leaders themselves, given their demonstrable contempt for their own citizenry — are indeed the nuclear force and, even more significant, the conventional forces that cement the Soviet empire militarily.
Third, the U.S. ought to continue the modernization program for its strategic arsenal, though not at the fever pitch that marks the practice of the Reagan administration’s. A counterforce deterrent with enhanced credibility is contingent upon the explicit resolve to field the most effective war-fighting force, and that means the most accurate and discriminating weapons that American technology can produce. Instead of the Reagan-Weinberger shotgun approach, however, which seeks to seize everything in the store, sufficiency for deterrence through denial merely requires selective improvements in the strategic nuclear “triad” (that is, land, sea, and air forces), as well as in theatre (TNF) and tactical (TNW) nuclear forces and in defensive systems.
Such selective improvements might include the following prudential judgements based on the political and ethical feasibility of the specific measures as deterrents to Soviet aggression.
At the TNF level the continued deployment of the 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) — each with a lone warhead — will, as an intermediate force in NATO-Europe, displace far less satisfactory weapons in place such as the Pershing I missiles with their limited range and slower launch. The new TNF arsenal will also provide a substantial counterweight to the 375 or so accurate triple-warhead Soviet SS20s, which had inaugurated a new arms race at a new level in the late 1970s. The Pershing II, however, is a high-risk gamble. Its extremely brief flight time (6-10 minutes from launch until impact) has led the Soviets to threaten a hair-trigger “launch-on-warning” policy, and the deployment of these highly valuable missiles exclusively in West Germany —the heart of NATO’s vulnerable Central Region — would make them first-order targets in a Soviet attack, possibly provoke the Soviets into a foolish preemptive strike or compel the U.S. to “use them or lose them” in the event of a conventional Soviet invasion of NATO territory. Therefore, despite the symbolic value of the Pershing II as a demonstration of U.S. will power and responsiveness to its European allies’ initial request in 1979, deployment of the Pershing II ought to be discontinued and an equivalent number of the .slower air-breathing GLCMs substituted for them in various Western European sites.
The continued production and actual deployment of the “enhanced radiation warhead” (ERW), or so-called “neutron bomb,” in mobile forward defensive positions in West Germany would serve the same purpose of ethical/feasible modernization at the tactical battlefield level. This highly discriminating nuclear fusion weapon with its rather minimal 1-kiloton destructive capability would supplant the 5000 or so “dirty” fission TNWs that still remain after President Reagan’s unilateral retirement in 1983 of some 2000 of them. But all of these mostly Hiroshima-scale TNWs have been rendered virtually useless in any conceivable tactical combat scenario due to their excessive kilotonnage and blast and heat effects. To be sure, it would be preferable to replace the present generation of fission TNWs and the newer ERWs by vastly improved “conventional” precision-guided weapons systems such as the multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS), which conceivably would be as effective in disabling armored columns as the ERW but without lowering or obfuscating the nuclear threshold. But the ERW, with its considerably reduced blast and heat effects and great potential for discrimination between friendly civilian and enemy combat personnel, still would represent a marked military and ethical improvement over the supposed backbone of NATO-Europe’s policy of flexible response — namely, the infeasible and incredible fission TNWs.
Essential modernization at the strategic level could be confined to three programs that, taken together, would enhance the credibility of the U.S. nuclear “triad” as a deterrent to Soviet aggression against the U.S. or its allies.
(1) The U.S. should proceed with the construction of the new Ohio-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) equipped with advanced Trident II missiles, which feature D-5 warheads with such greatly improved accuracy over their Trident I and Poseidon predecessors that they pose a decisive counterforce threat to the 1398 hard-target Soviet ICBMs. Each of these 12 Congressionally authorized SSBNs, which will replace the current generation of aging Poseidon SSBNs, eventually will carry 24 Trident II missiles with 8-10 warheads apiece. Initial deployment of the Trident II is scheduled for 1989, when the ninth new Ohio-class SSBN will be launched; the first eight of the SSBNs with their Trident I missiles also will be retro-fitted with the newer, improved missiles. Short of any unanticipated technological breakthroughs in anti-submarine warfare (ASW), the result should be a giant step toward guaranteeing for the U.S. a substantial counterforce retaliatory capability. With half the fleet in port at any given time, the virtual invulnerability of the force at sea would ensure a second-strike force consisting in at least 1150 warheads.
(2)As a hedge against advancements in ASW, the long-range bomber force could stand improvement, although not the full range of redundancies planned by the Reagan administration. New air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) armed with nuclear warheads have been deployed thus far on 90 modified, albeit extremely aging, B-52G bombers (out of a total of 172 still operational), and the slightly less obsolescent B-52H bombers in service are being similarly modified. These highly accurate, less powerful ALCMs represent a marked practical and ethical improvement over the two MK28 multi-megaton thermonuclear gravity bombs with which each B-52 heretofore has been equipped. In addition, research and development is proceeding for the most sophisticated radar-evasive bomber ever conceived — the so-called “Stealth” bomber, or what Secretary Weinberger modestly terms the “Advanced Technology Bomber” (ATB). Since 50-100 of these spectacular vehicles are scheduled for deployment in less than a decade at a cost of $10 billion for research and development and another $10 billion for production, the U.S. ought to abandon once and for all the comparatively pedestrian B-1B bomber as far too costly for its anticipated short-lived usefulness. Surely the ancient B-52s dating from 1958 and 1961, respectively, can, in their modified, reincarnated form, endure for another ten years.
(3)The land-based division of the strategic triad poses a unique problem. Historically, the ICBMs have been the most “glamorous” component, if indeed such a term is appropriate for engines of destruction, of both the American and Soviet nuclear arsenals. The predominance of the ICBMs in terms of quality and sheer numbers of launchers, warheads, and megatonnage has made them the focus of bilateral arms control negotiations. In recent years the Soviets have conducted the most extensive nuclear buildup in history, and their massive multiple-warhead SS18 missiles are the most powerful weapons even devised by man. Meanwhile, the U.S. has been struggling through the last two presidencies to improve its existing force of 1052 ICBMs by finding a suitable basing-mode for the latest experimental ICBM — the ever-controversial MX missile, which the Reagan administration has euphemistically renamed the “Peacekeeper.”
Although it is not easy to resist the flow of recent U.S. strategic thinking and arms control concerns, I must add another voice to the growing chorus of nay-sayers in the interests of a truly credible, feasible, and cost-effective nuclear deterrent. It is time for the “Peacekeeper” to rest in peace. The Pentagon seeks to deploy 100 MX missiles, each armed with 10 counterforce nuclear warheads with 300 kilotons of explosive power apiece. But the current plan to locate these originally mobile missiles in hardened Minuteman ICBMs silos — a last desperate resort, to be sure, to “save” this benighted missile in the Congress — would represent only a marginal, hardly cost-effective improvement over the existing force of fixed-site ICBMs. If the Minuteman, particularly the 550 newer Minuteman III missiles, is deemed “vulnerable” to a Soviet first-strike, what would shield the MX (indeed, a more attractive target for the Soviets) in the same ascertainable locations? Twenty-one MX missiles have already been funded by the Congress and are scheduled for deployment in 1986; given this fait accompli, these few might as well replace 21 older ICBMs. Another 21 previously authorized MX missiles await funding to the tune of $1.5 billion in the Congress this spring. No less a conservative luminary than Senator Barry Goldwater (R. -Ariz.) has abandoned the cause, advising the President to do likewise. The only realistic value of the MX lies in its potential as a “bargaining chip” in the renewed arms control talks with the Soviets. Again no less a respected expert than Andrei Sakharov, one of the fathers of the Soviet H-bomb, stunned international security circles when in 1983 he proposed that the U.S. “spend a few billion dollars on MX missiles” as a means of redressing the imbalance in ICBM forces, thereby creating a more fertile ground for negotiated reductions in “powerful silo-based missiles.” But the price is too high. Moreover, if the Soviets knew that the chief, if not sole, function of the MX were to lure them into a negotiated reduction of their own esteemed ICBMs, the credibility of the MX as a nuclear deterrent would be tarnished at best.
If a land-based component is deemed essential to a credible U.S. policy of nuclear deterrence (a debatable proposition, to be sure), it would be better to pursue the central recommendation of the Scowcroft Commission in April, 1983. The smaller, possibly mobile, single-warhead “Midgetman” ICBM could be deployed in the 1990s. It may not be as accurate a counterforce weapon as the MX, but the Midgetman would surpass the Minuteman III in this regard and vastly increase by about a thousand the number of targets for the Soviets, who would have to counter this measure, if they so chose, by increasing the number of their far more expensive SS18s.
Finally, the President’s Strategic Defense Initiative promises more than a “selective” improvement in the U.S. nuclear deterrent posture. In the immediate future a nascent strategic defense could supplement the counterforce-oriented modernization outlined in the preceding paragraphs. The specific non-nuclear layered defense program proposed by the “High Frontier” project team appears quite feasible and worthy of implementation in some form.
(1)A “point defense” layer would defend the vulnerable ICBM silos by utilizing improved radar devices plus computer-directed “shotgun” swarms of rocket volleys containing small steel-encased high-velocity projectiles (SWARMJET), or rocket interceptors, or high-fire-rate guns at a range of 1,000-8,000 feet such as the GAU-8 cannon. Deployment could occur in as few as two or three years at the cost of $2-3 million per Soviet warhead, or roughly the cost of superhardening the ICBM silos for the MX missiles.
(2)An initial global ballistic missile defense (GBMD-1) would encompass 200-500 multiple-vehicle satellites or orbital platforms (launched, ironically, by the MX booster rocket), each with 30-150 infrared-guided interceptor projectiles as kinetic energy impact weapons with an effective range of 3,000-4,000 feet. These would be used to destroy hostile ICBMs in their “boost-phase” (that is, early in their trajectories). The application of existing technology, given a high priority, would facilitate deployment in five or six years at a projected cost of $15 billion, or about the same as the Reagan MX program.
(3)An advanced space-based layer (GBMD-2) would track ballistic missiles throughout their exoatmospheric trajectories with the assistance of advanced infrared-sensing devices. The anti-nuclear devices themselves would include directed-energy or beam weapons such as particle beams, highpower microwaves, or high-energy lasers based either on space satellites or on the ground, in the latter case employing satellites as reflecting “mirrors.” Also needed would be a manned high-performance “spaceplane” for repairs and maintenance. The estimated cost for this most exotic phase is $5 billion beyond the cost of GBMD-1, but that seems grossly understated, given the ten to twelve year lead time and the strictly theoretical nature of these advanced devices.
Conceding the rather speculative nature of the third layer of the “High Frontier,” one must be impressed by the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of the first two phases in a prospective policy of strategic defense. Undoubtedly the Soviets, too, would be so impressed. In all cases of counter-force weapons improvements, it should be added, strict limitations on the numbers of such nuclear weapons would signal to the Soviets at once an intent to modernize and hence to use these weapons, if necessary, as a last resort and a desire simply to deny victory to the adversary. And that, in the final analysis, is the most credible nuclear deter rent that U.S. dollars and conscience can buy.