Intelligent Design: Philosophy or Science?

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Trouble brews for the occasional scientist who decides to publicly question the orthodoxy of neo-Darwinism in peer-reviewed journals. Occasionally there are slip-ups which help to corroborate the general rule. For example, in 2004 Richard Sternberg, evolutionary biologist, and editor of the journal, Proceedings of the Biological Society of Washington, published Stephen C. Meyer’s “The Origin of Biological Information and the Higher Taxonomic Categories” in that journal, after receiving positive peer-reviews. Meyer’s article, however, was unrepentantly favorable to the theory that “intelligent design” was involved in biological evolution. In the aftermath of the publication, Sternberg was accused by colleagues and scientists of faulty judgement, and subjected to harassment and demotion when his position as a Research Associate came up for renewal. He resigned in frustration and is currently a research scientist at the Biologic Institute.

The reason that such articles are taboo in major scientific journals is that they must pass a litmus test of “methodological naturalism,” i.e, methodological materialism, ruling out any non-material entity or activity. To interject discussion of a “designing intelligence” at the origin of the earliest biological developments is considered strictly out of the bounds of legitimate scientific inquiry—a religious approach, “Creationism” parading under the guise of science.

Occasional books by scientists have dared to flout the orthodoxy of evolutionary “natural selection” mechanisms, by challenging some tenets of Darwinian theory. For example, two books published by scientists during the 1980s, Evolution: a Theory in Crisis, by Michael Denton, and The Mystery of Life’s Origin: Reassessing Current Theories, by chemist Charles Thaxton; and engineer Walter Bradley and geochemist Roger Olsen, helped to give rise to the Intelligent Design movement. More recently, card-carrying atheists have joined the battle: Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, in What Darwin Got Wrong; and Bradley Monton, in Seeking God in Science: An Atheist Defends Intelligent Design.

Such critical maneuvers are definitely not kosher in the American scientific millieu. For example, J.Y. Chen, a Chinese paleontologist, gave a lecture at the University of Washington geology department in 2000, in which he argued that the Chinese fossil evidence contradicted the Darwinian theory. One professor in the audience, not inured to such dissent, asked Chen whether he wasn’t a bit nervous about expressing his doubts about Darwinism so freely. Chen answered. “In China, we can criticize Darwin, but not the government. In America, you can criticize the government, but not Darwin.”

Certainly one of the most controversial issues in neo-Darwinism concerns the Cambrian Era, ca. 540 million years ago. According to Meyer’s 2013 book, Darwin’s Doubt: The Explosive Origin of Animal Life and the Case for Intelligent Design, 23 animal phyla appeared suddenly in the Cambrian era in less than 10 million years, which in geologic time is comparable to one minute in a 24-hour day. Some soft-bodied animals have been found in a few localities around the world from the preceding Ediacaran era (635 to 542 million years ago), but no ancestors have been found for 19 of the Cambrian phyla. (Prior to the Ediacaran era, only single-celled organisms inhabited the earth for about 3 billion years.)

Charles Darwin himself, says Meyers, had substantial doubts about the emergence of the Cambrian era, and expressed these doubts in a number of places in his writings, but hoped that future scientific explorations would turn up the missing but expected fossil ancestors. In entertaining this hope, Darwin contrasted with his contemporary critical “nemesis,” Louis Agassiz, a biologist who insisted that the lack of pre-Cambrian (“Selurian”) fossils was a major weakness in Darwin’s theory about gradual evolution through natural selection.

Meyer, current director of the Discovery Institute in Seattle, concentrates in Darwin’s Doubt on this alleged “Achilles heel” of neo-Darwinism. He examines in great detail attempts of evolutionists to answer the challenge of the Cambrian era, and to defend, if possible, the present biological orthodoxy. He starts with an account of the multiple attempts by evolutionists to find pre-Cambrian fossils, or explain why they haven’t been found—including Stephen Jay Gould’s explanation—the theory of “punctuated equilibrium” (which Gould originally claimed rendered neo-Darwinism “effectively dead, despite its persistence as textbook orthodoxy,” but after trenchant criticism was modified to incorporate some explicit Darwinian mechanisms.) Meyers continues in his over 500-page book to examine ongoing attempts to apply neo-Darwinism to the earliest biotic developments—vain or methodologically hampered experiments to show how genetic and/or epigenetic developments could progress towards targets by means of mutations and/or natural selection—theories concerning self-organization, “Evo-devo,” “epigenetic inheritance,” “natural genetic engineering,” etc.

Meyer compares his approach, and the procedures of “historical sciences” in general, to the work of detectives in solving mysteries. He cites the example of Chesterton’s novel, The Invisible Man, in which all the clues and suspects regarding a murder had been examined, until the one suspect who had been overlooked, because of a mental block by witnesses, was pointed out by the perspicacious sleuth, Fr. Brown. He concludes that if scientists could divest themselves of their own mental blocks, they would see that only an intelligence could be responsible for the highly specified type of information in DNA, RNA, dGRNs, etc. He justifies this as a scientific conclusion: it is science in the sense of historical sciences like paleontology and archeology.  If evolutionary science goes back to the very beginning of biological “information,” he argues, we cannot avoid encountering what can only be some kind of intelligence.

Meyer’s reference to the special attributes of “historical sciences” brings to my mind some memories of a transition that took place at my university, some years ago, when the history department, which embodied studies of what then fell under the category of “science” in the catalogue of courses, was reclassified to be incorporated into the College of Liberal Arts. Debates are still rife as to whether history is a bona fide science or a branch of the humanities—or perhaps a hybrid.

My own conclusion is that investigations of early development of the biotic information and “codes” that are at the basis of all living beings, like the investigations of cosmologists trying to piece together the origins of the Big Bang, are getting beyond the empirical to the metaphysical. I think of the famous woodcut, A Man Exploring the Meeting of Earth and Sky, which shows a man at the edge of the universe peeking out into the yonder. In recent decades cosmologists and astronomers seem to have been the most prominent in exploring scientific grounds for theistic belief. The physicist, Robert Griffiths, recently remarked, “If we need an atheist for a debate, I go to the philosophy department.  The physics department isn’t much use.”

Such discoveries at the “edge” of the empirical have been a syndrome in Western philosophy for millennia. Plato, considering all the gradations of goodness in the world, concluded to an absolute Form of Good of which all finite goods are mere partial participants. Aristotle in his Physics concluded from all movements to a first Mover, and from all causality to a first Cause, the examination of which was included in Aristotle’s treatise on First Philosophy (the Metaphysics).  St. Thomas Aquinas incorporated these conclusions into his “5 ways” for proving the existence of God.

But Plato’s absolute Good, separate from all its reflections in finite goods, is clearly outside the empirical. And Aristotle’s God, as an uncaused cause (and even the cause of all causality) and as an unmoved mover, is not like any of the causes or movers we are familiar with.

So also, Meyer’s “Intelligence” is unlike any intelligence we are familiar with, but a paradoxical, metaphysical type of intelligence—an Intelligence whose thinking or ideas are in no way separated from objects thought about, but automatically imbedded in reality, for us to try to investigate and appreciate. St. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, includes an article in his Summa (I.14.8) in which he argues that the design in God’s intellect (scientia artificis) is the cause of all created things.

It is through the science of cosmology that the atheistic astronomer, Fred Hoyle, finally came to the conclusion that a “superintellect has monkeyed with physics, as well as chemistry and biology”; and it was through the science of biology that the “dean” of atheistic philosophers, Anthony Flew, towards the end of his life concluded, to the consternation of his colleagues, that God existed. When asked why, he responded that he came to this conclusion “almost entirely because of the DNA investigations.”

So also, proponents of Intelligent Design, finding complex and specified information, surpassing the most elaborate computer codes, at the dawn of living organisms, even prior to all possibility of “natural selection,” have concluded to a Designer. But their work is not, strictly speaking, scientific investigation, but rather the sort of specific analyses we might expect in the philosophy of science, a specialized subdivision of philosophy. And the evidence put forward of “intelligent design” is a philosophical conclusion, indebted to, and dependent on, the methodology and quantitative analyses of scientists, but not, strictly speaking, scientific theories.

Occasionally, even hard-nosed evolutionary biologists may wonder whether neo-Darwinism is up to the job of explaining the origin of life; but the leap to an Intelligent Designer is a leap into metaphysics, and is often considered “above their paygrade.” If they are philosophically committed to methodological materialism, their hesitance is unavoidable, and the ongoing debate is not just about scientific credentials but philosophical presuppositions.

Howard Kainz


Howard Kainz is professor emeritus at Marquette University. He is the author of several books, including Natural Law: an Introduction and Reexamination (2004), The Philosophy of Human Nature (2008), and The Existence of God and the Faith-Instinct (2010). Professor Kainz is a regular contributor to Crisis Magazine.

  • Michael Paterson-Seymour

    “But their work is not, strictly speaking, scientific investigation, but rather the sort of specific analyses we might expect in the philosophy of science…”

    That must be right. Natural science, as it has developed since the 17th century looks not for causes, but laws, that is observed invariable relations between phenomena, (preferably those that can be quantified and expressed in differential equations), whereas metaphysics investigates causes. Science is not interested in causes at all (although scientists, being human, are), but only with predicting phenomena on the basis of those past observations that have been generalised as laws.

    This is what Bertrand Russell meant, when he said that “The law of gravitation will illustrate what occurs in any advanced science. In the motions of mutually gravitating bodies, there is nothing that can be called a cause, and nothing that can be called an effect; there is merely a formula.”

    • vishmehr24

      Is it really so?
      Don’t the physicists say that matter causes the space-time to curve and the curved space-time leads to gravitational attraction?

      • JBubs

        Seems to me there are 2 types of science: Method science that uses lab experiments to make predictions, and forensic science that uses observation of phenomena that cannot be reproduced experimentally in a lab. Both are valid. Both have their place in the narrowly defined “science” or “philosophy” circles.

        • Michael Paterson-Seymour

          Of course. One cannot test Kepler’s three laws of planetary motion in a lab; one can only infer them from repeated observations. Likewise, one can account, as LaPlace did, for differences between the observed and theoretical motion by planetary perturbation – in other words, the positions and velocities of the other planets are introduced as new variables in the formulae.

          Indeed, it was the observed perturbation of the orbit of Uranus that led to the simultaneous discovery of Neptune by Adams and Le Verrier.

          • fredx2

            No, you can send space probes out to the planets, and they follow the rules of planetary motion, just like larger bodies. So you can test them. That’s how, in part, we got to the moon.

      • Michael Paterson-Seymour

        No, they say the curvature of space-time is proportionate to the mass and, conversely, the mass is proportionate to the curvature in space-time. When one variable is known, the other can be calculated, that is all and there is no need to invoke the concept of cause or effect.

        • vishmehr24

          To say that mass causes space-time to curve is a statement that makes sense in physics (and can be found in textbooks).
          To say that space-time curvature causes mass would be absurd.

          There is more in physics than equations.

          • Michael Paterson-Seymour

            “To say that space-time curvature causes mass would be absurd.”

            I agree, but the absurdity comes from introducing causal language into one’s description.

            Russell’s point is about the logical status of propositions. He argues the science IS the formula, not the explanatory language that may accompany it. In other words, science is concerned with law-like explanations, not causal mechanisms, with antecedents and consequents, not causes and effects

            Prediction, then, consists in replacing the symbols for variables with expressions representing special cases of those variables. Of course, as in any logical system, there are distinct variable provisos, which accompany certain axioms and are inherited by theorems, that forbid unsound substitutions. No notion of causality is required to secure this

            • vishmehr24

              “He argues the science IS the formula, not the explanatory language that may accompany it”

              CS Lewis says the very reverse in The Discarded Image– the scientist seeks through mathematics an understanding that is not entirely mathematical.

              And that is why quantum mechanics (QM) is regarded by even the greatest physicists as incomprehensible since the desired non-mathematical understanding is lacking in QM.

    • vishmehr24

      Could you predict anything on the basis on past observations alone?
      To predict, one needs a model of causation. Thus, causation-talk is inevitable in physics and indeed it forms the goal of the physics.

      • Michael Paterson-Seymour

        No, it simply finds a correlation between the dimensions of the crater and the mass and velocity of the asteroid. Given any two, the other can be calculated

        • vishmehr24

          Please, I study these astrophysical papers in my work. They do not go about correlating but they build physical models of the processes that lead to crater formation for example.

        • fredx2

          If science were unconcerned about causes, they would not be looking into what caused the big bang. What causes diseases. What causes earthquakes. What causes global warming. What caused the great extinction events. etc etc.

    • vishmehr24

      Anthropological global warming (AGW) is a theory that explicitly claims that human activities (in particular anthropogenic CO2 emissions) CAUSE global warming.
      A lot hinges on the question whether global temperatures are caused or merely correlated with atmospheric CO2 concentration and anthropogenic CO2 emissions.

      Thus, your assertion that modern science does not deal with causation is false.

    • fredx2

      Well then Bertrand Russell had it wrong,. Two mutually gravitating bodies influence the space time around each of them, and it is bent, causing them to come together. What Russell meant was that “we don’t know what causes gravity at the current time, all that science does is forecast via a formula how it works”. We are now learning more about how gravity works and will someday be able to explain it in its fullness.

      • Michael Paterson-Seymour

        For Russell (as for Comte before him) science is the search for differential equations: “Certain differential equations can be found, which hold at every instant for every particle of the system, and which, given the configuration and velocities at one instant, or the configurations at two instants, render the configuration at any other earlier or later instant theoretically calculable. That is to say, the configuration at any instant is a function of that instant and the configurations at two given instants” The quest for causes is, in reality a quest for variables that can be formed into those equations.

        Event A is explained, insofar as it an be shown to be a function of Event B and, unlike a causal sequence, it does not matters whether A precedes or follows B.

        It makes not a whit of difference.whether the resulting laws are invariable or mere statistical generalisations, with a given range of probability.. Indeed, he argues elsewhere that determinism is an “empty category,” incapable of distinguishing any sequence of events from any other.

  • ProtestantFriend

    It troubled me that the solution to the Schrödinger equation for the particle in an infinite well was imaginary and in order to make it “real” the complex conjugate was pulled from thin air to turn the imaginary solution to a real one. I immediately asked, “What if the solution is supposed to be imaginary?” to which the professor replied, “It can’t be”
    But the math proves that is IS.
    Do not insult God by confining Him to science. There is no science if there can be no measurement, and measurement by experiment. If there is no experiment that replicate the results, there is no science, only philosophy – or religion.

    • Michael Paterson-Seymour

      “There is no science if there can be no measurement…”

      Indeed and, according to the Book of Wisdom, “Thou hast ordered all things in measure and number and weight” [11:20]

  • Stanley Anderson

    Simple clear arithmetic operations on simple clear fractions (ie, “rational numbers”) of a simple clear shape (a square and its diagonal) led the ancient Pythagorean Greeks to a (again, very simple and clear) unassailable proof with the inescapable conclusion that something other than fractions MUST exist (in particular, the square root of two). A very curious thing was that the proof says absolutely nothing about the size or “location” of that square root of two — it might be a little less than one or somewhere around 300 penultigazillion or negative seven-point-twentythree. The proof doesn’t care in the slightest. It only says that things that are not fractions are “out there somewhere” whether you like it or not and whether or not you can actually find one. Another curious thing — and most important for this subject — is that the proof did not “invade” from the outside like Visigoths attacking Rome, but is a result deduced entirely “from within” — ie, the rational numbers’ own “incompleteness” points to that incompleteness and to the fact that something “outside” exists.

    And that sort of pointing “out there” entirely from “within” has repeated itself in virtually every major area of mathematics and science since then, from the idea of “imaginary numbers” to non-Euclidean geometry to Gödel’s incompleteness theorems to Special and General Relativity and to the capstone quantum physics which must be the epitome of “we have no idea what it could possibly be — we only know it MUST be out there” thinking in science and math.

    Yet this sort of “let’s follow wherever the pointing seems to lead, regardless of the consequences” thinking, so prevalent in science and math throughout the ages, is simply not allowed in this one case regarding evolution. The gods of materialism and atheism must be appeased with some sort of sacrifice, apparently.

    • Michael Paterson-Seymour

      The proof that the square root of 2 is based on Pythagoras’s theorem shows that it must be greater than 1, for the diagonal of a square must be greater than the side. From this it is simple to deduce that, as a continued fraction, the square root of 2 = 1; 2,2………………

      • Stanley Anderson

        The proof I am talking about (I hope this is not too far afield from the subject of the article) is not the Pythagorean theorem for calculating the length of the sides of a right triangle. It is a proof that the length of the diagonal of a unit square (ie, the square root of two) is not “commensurate” with the sides of the square — in other words that the square root of two is not a fraction (i.e., a number expressed as a/b where “a” and “b” are integers, aka a “rational number”), but is rather “something else” that is now called an “irrational number.”

        This is an independent conclusion and not connected to the familiar Pythagorean theorem you are referring to. The confusion may lie in the fact that I mentioned the ancient Greek Pythagoreans who discovered that proof of the irrationality of the square root of two. In fact, when they discovered it, they were so distraught over the idea that other “numbers” besides fractions could exist, that it is said that they tried to keep the proof secret. In fact, it there are suggestions (apparently unfounded or not verified) that they actually attempted murder in order to keep the revelation secret.

        So I guess that might, after all, be a sort of ancient equivalent to the intense discomfort modern day evolutionists feel over the idea that natural selection and the origin of life might require something other than “mechanistic” explanations and the subsequent attempts to suppress explorations into that possibility.

        As they say, nothing new under the sun, I guess…

        • Michael Paterson-Seymour

          Stanley Anderson

          We do not know Pythagoras’s proof of the irrationality of the square root of 2.

          There is a very simple proof, taking a square with side a and diagonal d, where d squared equals 2a squared. Taking the ratio d:a::m:n it obvious that m and n must both be even numbers. From this, both the irrationality of the square root of 2 (d & a are incommensurate) and its calculation as a continued fraction (2 = 1; 2,2…) follows.

          On the other hand, he may have arrived at it via the connected problem of squaring the rectangle i.e. constructing a square equal in area to a given rectangle, which we know he solved, but I am guessing.

          • Stanley Anderson

            I suppose another point of confusion is that the “Pythagoreans” were named after “Pythagoras” so that the proof of the irrationality of the square root of two is not a proof attributed to Pythagoras, but to the Pythagoreans.

            And another point of confusion is that the proof itself really has nothing to do with a square or its diagonal per se. The proof is strictly algebraic. I used that image of the diagonal of a square because it is a nice “visual” image of two segments (the side of a square and the diagonal of the square) that are incommensurate and yet clearly closely related geometrically.

            But the proof I am talking about has no need of using a square as a guide. The mention of a square and its diagonal was simply a way to say “See? here is something handy and immediately obvious and ‘everyday’ that nevertheless has incommensurate numbers fundamentally engrained in its structure” — i.e., that these incommensurate numbers are not weird, esoteric, “I’ll never run across one in my life” sort of things).

            With reluctance (for this is surely getting far afield of the article above, and many who hate math may run screaming from the room), but because it is relatively simple and short, here is the proof (simplified and shortened as much as possible for this sort of post, so some steps are left out that might make it clearer to some people) :

            Assume the square root of two can be represented by a fraction, a/b where a and b are integers and in lowest terms (ie, no common factors). The square root of two means that a/b * a/b = 2 = a^2/b^2. That means a^2 = 2*b*2 which means that a^2 must be even (divisible by 2). But that then means that “a” itself must be even since only an even number times itself can be even (an odd number times itself must be odd). But if a is even, that means a^2 must also be divisible by 4. And that means that the other side, 2*b^2 must also be divisible by 4. But that means that b^2 must also be even, which means that “b” itself is even. But that means “a” and “b” are both even which means they are not in “lowest terms” for the fraction a/b. This contradiction means that the square root of two cannot be a fraction.

            As I said above, that is all. The proof doesn’t give us any idea about the size of the square root of two or what that sort of “number” it could possibly be like, only that it can’t be a fraction. That was the point of the illustration for my initial comment.

            (Let me see…What was the subject of the original article again? We now return you to your regularly scheduled program…)

            • Ib

              Hurrah, Stanley. This is exactly correct. Except that for Greek geometers, the proof was often expressed in a geometric figure. Michael PS needs to result his Maths a bit.

  • poetcomic1

    Darwin, Freud, Marx. The ‘future’ is two centuries old.

  • Hrafn

    Trouble brews for the occasional religious chauvinist who attempts to defend Intelligent Design.

    For example in 2004 (not 2007) creationist Richard Sternberg decided to help Stephen Meyer (who he had met at an ID conference) publish a paper reiterating Meyer’s Cambrian-therefore-ID claims in the last issue of the journal he was to edit. The paper cherry-picked its facts to criticise evolution and then parachuted in an endorsement of ID in its conclusion (by way of a false dichotomy). Its argument is reprised in ‘Darwin’s Doubt’, which has likewise been heavily criticised for its “selective scholarship” by the scientific community (including by one of the very sources that Meyer selectively quotes).

    The publisher of the journal then disavowed the article as (i) it was completely outside the journal’s subject of expertise, (ii) the journal’s standard editorial practice had not been followed and (iii) “it was doubtful whether the three scientists who peer reviewed the article and recommended it for publication were evolutionary biologists” (let alone paleontologists).

    Unsurprisingly, this behaviour subjected Sternberg to severe criticism. The claim that he was “subjected to harassment” is partisan and heavily disputed. The claim that he was demoted is absurd. “[H]is position as a Research Associate” was unpaid, and subject to the existence of a (since deceased) sponsor. Lacking a sponsor he was reclassified as a “research collaborator” on the renewal of the appointment in 2006.

    He now works at the Biologic Institute, which is funded by Meyer’s Discovery Institute, and has been widely derided by the scientific community for its lack of legitimate scientific output.

    Kainz get the names right, but completely flubs the relationships between them (including even the date).

  • Valentin

    It should be pointed out that philosophy means love of wisdom and that for a long time physics and biology were called natural philosophy.

    • JBubs

      “A rose by any other name…”

  • Greg Fazzari

    You have left out half of the discussion! The question is not only “is intelligent design science?”. The question is also “is evolution science?”. The only way anyone can embrace evolution from the data available – is to have materialistic presuppositions. The reason debate rages is that the data is inconclusive – big time! If there is ever a completely materialistic explanation for life, evolution will play a very small part.

  • jp

    evolutionary biology is philosophy not science

    • Michael Paterson-Seymour

      Have you considered that it might be neither, but, rather, history? I mean an historical theory, true or false, rather that an philosophical or a scientific one, belonging to the same class of propositions as “Philip was the father of Alexander” or “Richard III murdered the little princes in the Tower.”

      • Greg Fazzari

        Might be better to say that those that claim that “evolution is a fact that has answered all of our questions about the history of life” is a philosophical statement, not science.

  • hombre111

    Excellent. you do a better job than Platinga, on the same subject.

  • RickRyals

    Someone who should know better said:
    “The reason that such articles are taboo in major scientific journals is
    that they must pass a litmus test of “methodological naturalism,” i.e,
    methodological materialism, ruling out any non-material entity or
    activity. To interject discussion of a “designing intelligence” at the
    origin of the earliest biological developments is considered strictly
    out of the bounds of legitimate scientific inquiry—a religious approach, “Creationism” parading under the guise of science.”

    The missing cavete, of course, is that the author can’t imagine a single scientific scenario where a natural intelligence might intervene … and so the missing attached disclaimer notes that science doesn’t give a damn what creationists believe, it is only the evidence that matters, which is why the fact that these people are motivated creationists is not even a relevant point, nor should their religious affiliation be of concern.

    Science doesn’t give a damn that a catholic monk thought that evidence for the big bang meant that the literal interpretation of Genisis was true, proving that politics and not science are what define the bounds of this debate.

    Way to show your colors…

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  • Dhaniele

    Many thanks for a wonderful article. I have posted it for my students.

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  • Harry

    Not everyone believes archaeology is science, but if it is, so is intelligent design.

    There are limits to the configurations into which mindless, inanimate matter can accidentally assemble itself. What it does assemble itself into, as fascinating and unlikely as a given phenomenon may initially appear to be, sooner or later is seen to have been the inevitable result of the laws of physics applied to a particular physical environment.

    The reason we didn’t really expect a Mars rover to detect the kinds of things which cause archaeologists to conclude they have discovered the remains of an ancient city is that such things don’t come about mindlessly and accidentally. If a Mars rover had detected such things, entirely reasonable people would have concluded that there was at one time intelligent life on Mars. There are limits to what mindless, inanimate matter can accomplish, and there is always an inevitability to what it achieves.

    Streets and building walls lack that inevitability. If rectangular stones arranged such that they appear to be what is left of city streets and building walls cause entirely reasonable people to conclude that such arrangements were not the peculiar result of chance in combination with the laws of physics, but that the stones were shaped and put in place by intelligent agents, then what excuse is there for not concluding that digital-information-based nanotechnology was intelligently designed?

    The simplest single-celled life form consists of nanotechnology the functional complexity of which is light years beyond anything modern science knows how to build from scratch. The coding regions of DNA contain massive quantities of extremely precise, digital assembly instructions for the many intricate protein machines needed for cellular metabolism. Also contained there are the assembly instructions to build the cellular machinery that reads and utilizes the information in DNA in order to build cellular machinery. (Which means there is no way life could have come about mindlessly. Think about it.)

    The functional complexity of a single-celled organism is beyond that of an automated factory complete with computers directing the robotic equipment on the factory floor. That the technology in these miniaturized factories is far, far beyond our own is demonstrated by their ability to also “manufacture” more instances of themselves. So, in light of all this, why is it a “no brainer” to conclude that the archaeologist’s stones were intelligently shaped and arranged, yet there is a debate as to whether ultra-sophisticated, digital-information-based nanotechnology was intelligently designed?

    This is why: Because brainwashing is a reality. Because we have confused atheistic indoctrination with education. Because blind-faith-based atheism (one can’t prove God isn’t there, that belief must be taken on faith) has perverted science by insisting that the relentless objectivity true science requires be discarded when the facts raise doubts about atheistic dogma.