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  • America: Christian or Jacobin?

    by John Zmirak

    The following review originally appeared in the Summer 2005 edition of The Intercollegiate Review, and appears with the permission of the Intercollegiate Studies Institute.

     

    Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity,
    by Samuel P. Huntington, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004, $16.

     

    This is a rare book—erudite and readable, analytical but urgent, a work of political science which the author admits he wrote as “a patriot.” While few political theorists outside of certain radical circles are likely to admit that they are not patriotic, one encounters fewer still who write from an explicit desire to preserve and to protect their country. Not just its political institutions, or the ideology which undergirds them, but the concrete, shared reality that is America—so much of which, Huntington convincingly demonstrates, is the result not of inexorable historical processes, or the unfolding of mankind’s deepest yearnings and some obscure divine decree, but happy historical accidents. Serendipity.

    Among these accidents, the author is not embarrassed to point out, is the national character which marked the North American colonists—specifically, their “Anglo-Protestant culture.” Samuel Huntington convincingly challenges the corpus of Cold War (neoconservative and liberal) apologetics for American exceptionalism, which grounded America’s virtues exclusively in the Enlightenment ideology of some of the Founders. Professor Huntington notices that literally dozens of other nations were founded at almost the same time, by Enlightened liberal Freemasons from Colombia to Paraguay, yet few of them persevered in their liberal institutions. Why did Bolivar’s Republic founder into chaos and tyranny while Washington’s prospered and stayed (in certain ways) free? Because political seeds can only flourish when they fall in fertile ground. The soil in which liberal, decentralized government could survive—insofar as it has survived—was one which had been prepared for centuries before Jefferson ever set pen to paper.

    Huntington points to the suspicion of centralized authority which persisted in the dominant (Presbyterian, Quaker, and Puritan) strands of Protestantism to which the overwhelming majority of American settlers adhered, the century or more of congregational (rather than papal or episcopal) decision-making through which these churches were governed, and the very worldly work-ethic which dominated men of these creeds. These churches, he says, were the “reformation of the Reformation.” He contrasts their anti-authoritarianism, pragmatism, and general suspicion of institutions with the ways of Anglicans and Catholics—whose faith entails deference to established authority, resignation in the face of suffering, and a reverence for poverty. These are stereotypes, but who can look at Mexico and Texas (for instance) and fail to see their basis in fact? Compare, for that matter, the attitudes towards poverty, war and peace, and religious authority of President Bush and Pope Benedict XVI. One need not agree with the Puritan worldview to recognize that the psychological attitudes it inculcated still dominate American culture and are responsible for its most identifiable virtues and vices.

    This Anglo-Protestant root was planted by America’s earliest settlers—which Huntington carefully distinguishes from immigrants, dispelling the myth that this is a “nation of immigrants.” The Puritans of Massachusetts, the Quakers of Pennsylvania, the Scots-Irish of Tennessee were not impoverished individuals asking admittance of a developed, pre-existing polity to which they would assimilate. They were alien invaders, arriving in groups with clearly defined communal beliefs, determined to buy or wrest a continent away from divided, mutually hostile tribes of hunter-gatherers. That is not the situation faced by subsequent and contemporary immigrants to the United States—at least, not yet. With loving detail, Huntington shows how members of every ethnic group that arrived in the United States came to accept the cultural and political mores of its Anglo-Protestant founders. Jews who were not particularly observant in the Old Country established synagogues so they could attend weekly services like the Protestants. Catholics embraced the separation of Church and State—eventually dragging their mother Church after them. Even when religious groups set up their own parochial schools—to resist the steady pressure of Protestantization imposed in the public schools—they invariably laid heavy emphasis on patriotism, mastery of English, and the virtues of “Americanism.” Yet such institutions of Americanization, Huntington warns, have by now largely broken down—leaving a degraded commercial culture and the mass media as the sole means by which new Americans learn the ways of their adopted country.

    Huntington analyzes other developed and developing countries, in comparison and contrast with America, to suggest four themes around which national unity can develop:

    1. Ethnic, based on perceptions of a close-knit, consanguineous group. Examples include the nationalism which arose in Japan, Germany, Ireland, India,and the early American colonies.
    2. Racial, based on visible differences among peoples. Such a unifying principle, Huntington argues, inspired white Americans of various ethnicities once they had begun to intermarry and assimilate—until this identification was rendered morally repugnant during the Civil Rights Movement.
    3. Cultural, based on shared ways of living, unspoken preconceptions, and social mores. This mode of identification,Huntington suggests, is what unites most Americans today—although it is threatened by the racialism implicit in identity politics and affirmative action,and by the mass immigration of people from a single nation with a self-confident alternative culture, namely Mexico. He warns, compellingly, that these phenomena might well re-awaken an intolerant white nationalism, inflamed among members of a race who dare not speak its name, aware that their interests are under attack by other, self-conscious racial groups.
    4. Propositional, based on ideological maxims derived from political theory. Nations defined this way included Jacobin France and the Soviet Union. This principle of organization—surely the most fragile—is the only one offered as morally viable (and moral) both by liberal and by neoconservative theorists today. The extension of the American proposition, by force of arms if necessary, seems to be the goal of the ideology which Professor Claes G. Ryn calls, in his book of that name, The New Jacobinism

    Huntington examines the curious but encouraging persistence of religious practice among Americans—almost unparalleled in any developed country—and concludes that the United States simply cannot be described honestly as anything but a Christian nation. However, America’s mode of Christianity is intrinsically tolerant, individualistic, even entrepreneurial—again, with all the positive and negative attributes that follow along.He cites Irving Kristol’s famous advice to American Jews that they accept and welcome the country’s Christian orientation, which has guaranteed for them an environment almost entirely free of the bigotry Jews encountered in other societies.

    Furthermore, Huntington argues, most of the advances which America has seen towards equal opportunity and social reform have been driven by Gospel values and explicitly Christian movements—from abolitionism to the Civil Rights Movement— rather than by socialist activism, as happened through much of Europe. It is in this Christian core, which now encompasses Catholics, welcomes Jews, and accepts other, more alien faiths, so long as they accept the fundamental principle of tolerant co-existence, that Huntington hopes to ground the unified American identity of the future.

    Huntington does not spend time exploring the roots of our Founders’ creeds and concomitant political virtues, although he points to one writer who does: David Hackett Fisher, author of the invaluable ethnographic study of American settlement, Albion’s Seed (1989). That book, which ought to be read in tandem with this one, grounds the intellectual and political habits of early Americans in the inherited folkways they carried with them from England, and suggests how they developed. Equally important—perhaps as a corrective to Huntington’s fervent embrace of the Reformation—is Russell Kirk’s The Roots of American Order (1974), which shows how the institutions essential to liberty developed in medieval England, grounded in Common Law developed by Catholic jurists, before they were smothered during the Renaissance by the revival of pagan, Roman Law.

    Indeed, the reliance of both Protestant and Catholic churches on the support of centralizing monarchs to promote their ecclesiastical interests effectively demolished the Church as a countervailing force to the power of the state. It was left, ironically, to the most anti-Catholic movements in Christendom to restore that balance—which was achieved, irony of ironies, in America. The novus ordo seclorum had more in common with the older ordo than the American founders knew. And perhaps that fact is the real source of America’s exceptionalism.

    The views expressed by the authors and editorial staff are not necessarily the views of
    Sophia Institute, Holy Spirit College, or the Thomas More College of Liberal Arts.

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    • Michael PS

      The French case is very instructive. The Jacobins defined the nation, not in contrast to other nationalities, but in contrast to its own aristocracy – the nation is the community of all those who are not exempt from taxation, military service and other public duties. The corollary is that the nation includes all those, and only those, who are willing and capable of sharing in the service of the country. The national community, declared Renan, resides in the voluntary and revocable loyalty of its individual citizens. In this sense, the nation is based on a “plébiscite de tous les jours” – on a daily vote of confidence.

      To this day, the French citizen is defined as a person who is born on French soil, shares the cultural heritage of the country and gives evidence of loyalty to the French commonwealth. Populations of alien stock or culture who are born or living on French soil are either potential Frenchmen or else they are aliens by resolution, but they are neither aliens nor Frenchmen by birth alone.

      This is a nation based, not on ideology, but recognizing and celebrating the volitional element of citizenship.

      Contrast this with the German concept, according to which nationality is defined by descent and birth, and it is neither revocable nor is it attainable at will. A German may lose his citizenship but not his nationality. The term nationality, as it is defined in German legal practice, does not refer to citizenship and legal status, but to ethnic characteristics that are transmitted through descent, notably in the granting of citizenship to members of “communities of German descent.”

    • William P. Grossklas, Sr.

      Too many people make the mistake of confusing the people of the country with the government. They are not the same. The government always and everywhere is the enemy of the individual and his freedom and liberty. All government is vile and evil. Not so for my neighbors and friends.

      • Michael PS

        As Rousseau wrote in the Social Contract (III:15)
        “As soon as public service ceases to be the chief business of the citizens, and they would rather serve with their money than with their persons, the State is not far from its fall. When it is necessary to march out to war, they pay troops and stay at home: when it is necessary to meet in council, they name deputies and stay at home. By reason of idleness and money, they end by having soldiers to enslave their country and representatives to sell it… Sovereignty, for the same reason as makes it inalienable, cannot be represented; it lies essentially in the general will, and will does not admit of representation: it is either the same, or other; there is no intermediate possibility. The deputies of the people, therefore, are not and cannot be its representatives: they are merely its stewards, and can carry through no definitive acts. Every law the people has not ratified in person is null and void — is, in fact, not a law.”

        • Cord Hamrick

          Michael, respectfully…why did you post that Rousseau quote?

          First, what Rousseau said there isn’t actually true. It is, of course, undeniably good for the people to be informed and involved, in proportion with their individual wisdom. (If however the people consists of 90% Marxists and only the remaining 10% have the wisdom to support Christianity and economic liberty, better that the 90% remain voluntarily uninvolved and only the wise citizens bother to vote!)

          Moreover, there are many duties of the State that can’t and shouldn’t be done by direct democracy and require lawmaking through representation; that is, a Republic. (How effective would it have been, really, to decide the extremely secret details of the D-Day invasion through national referendum?) Thirdly, the employment of a willing proxy to exercise one’s just authority on one’s behalf is intrinsic to human life in a dozen ways, ranging from the right to hire a man to paint my house (an authority he won’t have unless I delegate it to him) to the Apostolic Succession. Government is another instance of that. The Rousseau quote, taken literally, denies this, so unless he was engaging in hyperbole, he was merely wrong. (He was wrong a lot.)

          Second, while you posted it as a response to what William said, it doesn’t really respond. It’s vaguely topical, but not in a way that says anything precise to affirm or deny or add to anything William said. Why post it as a reply, then? Why not a separate post?

          • Michael PS

            I thought it relevant to the dichotomy, so often drawn, between “the people” and “the government,” which was implicit in William’s remarks.

            Rousseau, of course, allows representatives a role as “stewards” [commissaires] in the administration of public affairs; he refers to “laws” as requiring the assent of the people, the general enactments binding on all citizens, as such

            • Carl

              William said “All government is vile and evil.”

              If all government is inherently evil than all forms must be destroyed. But with no social structure is in place we expose ourselves to the evil of chaos and anarchy!

              We must rise above the chaos and create an enforcer, government, to protect the social structure. The opening paragraphs to Thomas Paine’s Common Sense explains this concept very well.
              But later, Paine, in The Rights of Man creates a social structure of anarchy believing that man can govern himself individually while at the same time letting his neighbors do the same—anarchy! The French Revolution being a prime example of this “rights of man.” Oh, the humanity of it all!

              Obviously society must create social contracts somewhere between anarchy and an all powerful totalitarian government. Citizens must engage themselves into public matters and not depend on government to “take care of it.” It takes people and families not a village!

              So while we can’t blame all people within any nation’s borders of failing we can’t separate the people from its form of government. Yes, most often we get the government we deserve.

    • Sarto

      Interesting. I am doing research for a book on early Mormonism and was astonished to discover that, when Smith was born in 1805, only 17% of Americans were affiliated with a church. This was followed by huge efforts among the Protestants, especially the Presbyterians, Baptists, and Methodists to reconvert the people, with amazing success.

      As for the lack of success in Latin America? Those countries were governed by a Spanish and Portuguese elite who could not make a serious decision unless it was first cleared in Madrid or Lisbon. When those countries found their independence, leadership continued on the old model: a tiny elite a weak and insignificant middle class, a large slice of poor, and the majority with no place at all at the table.

      As much as anything, this teaches me the importance of a middle class, which is still sorely lacking in the Latin America with which I remain familiar. And as the 1% gets richer, and as the Middle Class continues to disappear in the U.S., get afraid, very afraid.

      • Carl

        That makes a lot of sense. When individuals become leaders of their own personal church don’t be surprised by what type of churches are actually created.

    • Jennifer Roche

      Interesting article. As our core values erode and we continue to elect “puppet politicians” who are really in the palm of the ruling media elite, America becomes just a shadow of what she once was.

      • Rich Browner

        The media is almost as much a puppet as any other organ. The “ruling elite” are those with the power of wealth who use the media and the government as puppets to continue to increase their wealth and power. America is run by lobbyists, lawyers, super PACs and cynics. If anyone is just noticing the diminishment of America, it has been going on for at least 25 years…probably longer.

    • Carl

      “It was left, ironically, to the most anti-Catholic movements in Christendom to restore that balance—which was achieved, irony of ironies, in America. The novus ordo seclorum had more in common with the older ordo than the American founders knew. And perhaps that fact is the real source of America’s exceptionalism.”
      I’m always saying that the greatest form of Catholic social teaching of Subsidiarity and Social Teaching in general is found in our founding documents and form of government. To which many times I get confused looks and funny faces, but I get no response when I ask, well then give me a better example from history or modern times?